

# PHILOSOPHICAL EXCERPTS

## AN ANTHOLOGY

prepared  
by  
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## INDEX

### **SECTION I “Are there any fundamental causes or is it just an illusion?”**

1 • <i>THE GAME OF CHESS</i> by JORGE LUIS BORGES.....	5
2 • Excerpts from <i>PHAEDO</i> by PLATO.....	6
3 • Excerpt from <i>THE REPUBLIC</i> by PLATO.....	9
4 • Excerpts from <i>MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY</i> by RENÉ DESCARTES....	10
5 • Excerpt from <i>AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING</i> by DAVID HUME.....	12
6 • Excerpt from <i>CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON</i> by IMMANUEL KANT.....	12
7 • Excerpt from <i>HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN</i> by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.....	13
8 • Excerpt from <i>THE GAY SCIENCE</i> by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.....	14
9 • Excerpts from <i>THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS</i> by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.....	16
10 • Excerpts from <i>ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE</i> by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.....	17
11 • Excerpts from FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE's <i>PREFACES</i> .....	19

### **SECTION II “What could be said about death, emotions and sexuality?”**

1 • Excerpts from <i>THE STAR OF REDEMPTION</i> by FRANZ ROSENZWEIG.....	22
2 • Excerpts from <i>BEING AND TIME</i> by MARTIN HEIDEGGER.....	23
3 • Excerpts from <i>WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?</i> by MARTIN HEIDEGGER.....	27
4 • Excerpt from <i>AS I WAS MOVING AHEAD OCCASIONALLY I SAW BRIEF GLIMPSES OF BEAUTY</i> by JONAS MEKAS.....	28
5 • Excerpts from <i>DE PROFUNDIS</i> by OSCAR WILDE.....	29
6 • Excerpts from <i>GOD, DEATH, AND TIME</i> by EMMANUEL LEVINAS.....	30
7 • Excerpt from <i>IDEA OF PROSE</i> by GIORGIO AGAMBEN.....	31

8 • Excerpt from <i>THE UNAVOWABLE COMMUNITY</i> by MAURICE BLANCHOT.....	32
9 • Excerpt from <i>MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND</i> by JACQUES DERRIDA.....	33
10 • Excerpt from <i>THE POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP</i> by JACQUES DERRIDA.....	33
11 • Excerpt from <i>NOLI ME TANGERE: ON THE RAISING OF THE BODY</i> by JEAN-LUC NANCY.....	34
12 • Excerpt from <i>CORPUS II: WRITINGS ON SEXUALITY</i> by JEAN-LUC NANCY.....	35
13 • Excerpts from JUDIT BUTLER's work (bonus track: an aphorism by RU PAUL)..	36
14 • Excerpts from <i>DIRT AND GENDER. PISS / SHIT. MALE FEMALE</i> by PAUL PRECIADO.....	37
15 • Excerpt from <i>THE SYMPOSIUM</i> by PLATO.....	38

### **SECTION III “Is peace a thing or does war rule instead?”**

1 • Excerpts from <i>LEVITATHAN or THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL</i> by THOMAS HOBBES.....	40
2 • Excerpts from <i>SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT</i> by JOHN LOCKE.....	42
3 • Excerpts from <i>DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN</i> by JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU.....	44
4 • Excerpt from <i>DRAMA AND BEREAVEMENT</i> by MASSIMO CACCIARI.....	45

ACTIVITIES → pp. 46-57

SYLLABUS → pp. 58-59

# SECTION I

**"THE GAME OF CHESS" by JORGE LUIS BORGES (1960)**

## I

In their grave corner, the players  
 Deploy the slow pieces. And the chessboard  
 Detains them until dawn in its severe  
 Compass in which two colors hate each other.

Within it the shapes give off a magic  
 Strength: Homeric tower, and nimble  
 Horse, a fighting queen, a backward king,  
 A bishop on the bias, and aggressive pawns.

When the players have departed, and  
 When time has consumed them utterly,  
 The ritual will not have ended.

That war first flamed out in the east  
 Whose amphitheatre is now the world.  
 And like the other, this game is infinite.

## II

Slight king, oblique bishop, and a queen  
 Blood-lusting; upright tower, crafty pawn –  
 Over the black and white of their path  
 They foray and deliver armed battle.

They do not know it is the artful hand  
 Of the player that rules their fate,  
 They do not know that an adamant rigor  
 Subdues their free will and their span.

But the player likewise is a prisoner  
 (The maxim is Omar's) on another board  
 Of dead-black nights and of white days.

God moves the player and he, the piece.  
 What god behind God originates the scheme  
 Of dust and time and dream and agony?

# Excerpts from "PHAEDO" by PLATO (387 BC)

## Nº 1

Then what about the actual acquiring of knowledge? Is the body an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge? I mean, for example, do men find any truth in sight or hearing, or are not even the poets forever telling us that we do not see or hear anything accurately, and surely if those two physical senses are not clear or precise, our other senses can hardly be accurate, as they are all inferior to these. Do you not think so?

I certainly do, he said.

When then, he asked, does the soul grasp the truth? For whenever it attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it.

True.

Is it not in reasoning if anywhere that any reality becomes clear to the soul?

Yes.

And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality.

That is so.

And it is then that the soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself?

It appears so.

What about the following, Simmias? Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not?

We do say so, by Zeus.

And the Beautiful, and the Good?

Of course.

And have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes?

In no way, he said.

Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of all things such as Bigness, Health, Strength and, in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is. Is what is most true in them contemplated through the body, or is this the position: whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to grasp that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to the knowledge of it?

Obviously.

Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it. Will not that man reach reality, Simmias, if anyone does?

What you say, said Simmias, is indeed true.

## Nº 2

Is not anything that is composite and a compound by nature liable to be split up into its component parts, and only that which is noncomposite, if anything, is not likely to be split up?

I think that is the case, said Cebes.

Are not the things that always remain the same and in the same state most likely not to be composite, whereas those that vary from one time to another and are never the same are composite?

I think that is so.

Let us then return to those same things with which we were dealing earlier, to that reality of whose existence we are giving an account in our questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform by itself, remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever?

It must remain the same, said Cebes, and in the same state, Socrates.

What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other?

The latter is the case, they are never in the same state.

These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible?

That is altogether true, he said.

Do you then want us to assume two kinds of existences, the visible and the invisible?

Let us assume this.

And the invisible always remains the same, whereas the visible never does?

Let us assume that too.

Now one part of ourselves is the body, another part is the soul?

Quite so.

To which class of existence do we say the body is more alike and akin?

To the visible, as anyone can see.

[...]

Then what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or not visible?

Not visible.

So it is invisible?—Yes.

So the soul is more like the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible?—Without any doubt, Socrates.

Haven't we also said some time ago that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or some other sense—for to investigate something through the body is to do it

through the senses—it is dragged by the body to the things that are never the same, and the soul itself strays and is confused and dizzy, as if it were drunk, in so far as it is in contact with that kind of thing?

Certainly.

But when the soul investigates by itself it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called wisdom?

Altogether well said and very true, Socrates, he said.

Judging from what we have said before and what we are saying now, to which of these two kinds do you think that the soul is more alike and more akin?

I think, Socrates, he said, that on this line of argument any man, even the dumbest, would agree that the soul is altogether more like that which always exists in the same state rather than like that which does not.

What of the body?

That is like the other.

Look at it also this way: when the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Then again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule and to lead, whereas it is that of the mortal to be ruled and be subject?

I do.

Which does the soul resemble?

Obviously, Socrates, the soul resembles the divine, and the body resembles the mortal.

### **Nº 3**

No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they keep away from them.

That would not be natural for them, Socrates, said Cebes.

By Zeus, no, he said. Those who care for their own soul and do not live for the service of their body dismiss all these things. They do not travel the same road as those who do not know where they are going but, believing that nothing should be done contrary to philosophy and their deliverance and purification, they turn to this and follow wherever philosophy leads.



# Excerpt from "THE REPUBLIC" by PLATO (365 BC)

[...] as the good is in the intelligible region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so the sun is in the visible region with respect to sight and what is seen."

"How?" he said. "Explain it to me still further."

"You know," I said, "that eyes, when one no longer turns them to those things over whose colors the light of day extends but to those over which the gleams of night extend, are dimmed and appear nearly blind as though pure sight were not in them."

"Quite so," he said.

"But, I suppose, when one turns them on those things illuminated by the sun, they see clearly and sight shows itself to be in these same eyes."

"Surely."

"Well, then, think that the soul is also characterized in this way. When it fixes itself on that which is illumined by truth and that which is, it intellects, knows, and appears to possess intelligence. But when it fixes itself on that which is mixed with darkness, on coming into being and passing away, it opines and is dimmed, changing opinions up and down, and seems at such times not to possess intelligence."

"Yes, that's the way it seems."

"Therefore, say that what provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows, is the *idea* of the good. And, as the cause of the knowledge and truth, you can understand it to be a thing known; but, as fair as these two are—knowledge and truth—if you believe that it is something different from them and still fairer than they, your belief will be right. As for knowledge and truth, just as in the other region it is right to hold light and sight sunlike, but to believe them to be sun is not right; so, too, here, to hold these two to be like the good is right, but to believe that either of them is the good is not right. The condition which characterizes the good must receive still greater honor."

"You speak of an overwhelming beauty," he said, "if it provides knowledge and truth but is itself beyond them in beauty. You surely don't mean it is pleasure."

"Hush,<sup>33</sup> Glaucon," I said. "But consider its image still further in this way."

"How?"

"I suppose you'll say the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but also with generation, growth, and nourishment although it itself isn't generation."

"Of course."

"Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity<sup>34</sup> and power."

(1641)

1) It is some years now since I realized how many false opinions I had accepted as true from childhood onwards, and that, whatever I had since built on such shaky foundations, could only be highly doubtful. Hence I saw that at some stage in my life the whole structure would have to be utterly demolished, and that I should have to begin again from the bottom up if I wished to construct something lasting and unshakeable in the sciences. But this seemed to be a massive task, and so I postponed it until I had reached the age when one is as fit as one will ever be to master the various disciplines. Hence I have delayed so long that now I should be at fault if I used up in deliberating the time that is left for acting. The moment has come, and so today I have discharged my mind from all its cares, and have carved out a space of untroubled leisure. I have withdrawn into seclusion and shall at last be able to devote myself seriously and without encumbrance to the task of destroying all my former opinions.

To this end, however, it will not be necessary to prove them all false —a thing I should perhaps never be able to achieve. But since reason already persuades me that I should no less scrupulously withhold my assent from what is not fully certain and indubitable than from what is blatantly false, then, in order to reject them all, it will be sufficient to find some reason for doubting each one. Nor shall I therefore have to go through them each individually, which would be an endless task: but since, once the foundations are undermined, the building will collapse of its own accord, I shall straight away attack the very principles that form the basis of all my former beliefs.

Certainly, up to now whatever I have accepted as fully true I have learned either from or by means of the senses: but I have discovered that they sometimes deceive us, and prudence dictates that we should never fully trust those who have deceived us even once.

2) I will therefore suppose that, not God, who is perfectly good and the source of truth, but some evil spirit, supremely powerful and cunning, has devoted all his efforts to deceiving me. I will think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds, and all external things are no different from the illusions of our dreams, and that they are traps he has laid for my credulity; I will consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, and no senses, but yet as falsely believing that I have all these; I will obstinately cling to these thoughts, and in this way, if indeed it is not in my power to discover any truth, yet certainly to the best of my ability and determination I will take care not to give my assent to anything false, or to allow this deceiver, however powerful and cunning he may be, to impose upon me in any way.

**3)** Archimedes claimed, that if only he had a point that was firm and immovable, he would move the whole earth; and great things are likewise to be hoped, if I can find just one little thing that is certain and unshakeable.

I therefore suppose that all I see is false; I believe that none of those things represented by my deceitful memory has ever existed; in fact I have no senses at all; body, shape, extension in space, motion, and place itself are all illusions. What truth then is left? Perhaps this alone, that nothing is certain.

But how do I know that there is not something different from all those things I have just listed, about which there is not the slightest room for doubt? Is there not, after all, some God, or whatever he should be called, that puts these thoughts into my mind? But why should I think that, when perhaps I myself could be the source of these thoughts? But am I at least not something, after all? But I have already denied that I have any senses or any body. Now I am at a loss, because what follows from this? Am I so bound up with my body and senses that I cannot exist without them? But I convinced myself that there was nothing at all in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Did I therefore not also convince myself that I did not exist either? No: certainly I did exist, if I convinced myself of something. —But there is some deceiver or other, supremely powerful and cunning, who is deliberately deceiving me all the time.— Beyond doubt then, I also exist, if he is deceiving me; and he can deceive me all he likes, but he will never bring it about that I should be nothing as long as I think I am something. So that, having weighed all these considerations sufficiently and more than sufficiently, I can finally decide that this proposition, 'I am, I exist', whenever it is uttered by me, or conceived in the mind, is necessarily true.

**4)** [...] when I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps such a figure does not exist, and has never existed, anywhere at all outside my thought, it nonetheless certainly has a determinate nature, or essence, or form, that is immutable and eternal, which was not invented by me, and does not depend on my mind. This is clear from the fact that it is possible to demonstrate various properties of the triangle (for instance, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, and that the hypotenuse subtends the greatest angle, and so forth) which, whether I like it or not, I now clearly recognize to hold good, even if up to now I have never thought of them in any way when imagining a triangle. And therefore these properties were not invented by me.

[...] from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and therefore that he exists in reality. It is not that my thought brings his existence about, or that it imposes any necessity on anything, but, on the contrary, that the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence of God, determines me to think it. Nor am I free to think of God without existence (that is, to think of the supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection), in the way I am free to imagine a horse with or without wings.

**Excerpt from “AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING”**

**by DAVID HUME (1748)**

The idea of God—meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being—comes from extending beyond all limits the qualities of goodness and wisdom that we find in our own minds. However far we push this enquiry, we shall find that every idea that we examine is copied from a similar impression.

**Excerpt from “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”**

**by IMMANUEL KANT (1781)**

Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a priori.



**Excerpt from "HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN"  
by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1878)**

MISUNDERSTANDING OF DREAMS.—In the ages of a rude and primitive civilisation man believed that in dreams he became acquainted with a *second actual world*; herein lies the origin of all metaphysics. Without dreams there could have been found no reason for a division of the world. The distinction, too, between soul and body is connected with the most ancient comprehension of dreams, also the supposition of an imaginary soul-body, therefore the origin of all belief in spirits, and probably also the belief in gods. "The dead continues to live, *for* he appears to the living in a dream": thus men reasoned of old for thousands and thousands of years.

**Excerpt from "THE GAY SCIENCE"**  
**by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE**  
(1882)

The Madman. Have you ever heard of the madman who on a bright morning lighted a lantern and ran to the market-place calling out unceasingly: "I seek God! I seek God!" As there were many people standing about who did not believe in God, he caused a great deal of amusement. Why? is he lost? said one. Has he strayed away like a child? said another. Or does he keep himself hidden? Is he afraid of us? Has he taken a sea voyage? Has he emigrated? - the people cried out laughingly, all in a hubbub. The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. "Where is God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction? - for even

Gods putrefy! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife - who will wipe the blood from us? With what water could we cleanse ourselves? What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it? There never was a greater event - and on account of it, all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto!" Here the madman was silent and looked again at his hearers; they also were silent and looked at him in surprise. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, so that it broke in pieces and was extinguished. "I come too early," he then said. "I am not yet at the right time. This prodigious event is still on its way, and is traveling - it has not yet reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the furthest star - and yet they have done it themselves!" It is further stated that the madman made his way into different churches on the same day, and there intoned his *Requiem aeternam deo*. When led out and called to account, he always gave the reply: "What are these churches now, if they are not the tombs and monuments of God?"



## N° 1

You ask me what's idiosyncratic about philosophers? . . . There is, for instance, their lack of a sense of history, their hatred for the very notion of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they're *honoring* a thing if they de-historicize it, see it *sub specie aeterni*<sup>25</sup>—if they make a mummy out of it. Everything that philosophers have handled, for thousands of years now, has been conceptual mummies; nothing real escaped their hands alive. They kill and stuff whatever they worship, these gentlemen who idolize concepts—they endanger the life of whatever they worship. For them, death, change, and age, like reproduction and growth, are objections—refutations, even. Whatever is does not *become*; whatever becomes *is* not . . .

Now, they all believe, desperately even, in what *is*. But since they can't get it into their clutches, they look for reasons why it's being withheld from them. "There has to be an illusion, a deception at work that prevents us from perceiving what *is*; where's the deceiver?"—"We've got the deceiver!" they cry happily, "it's sensation! These senses, *which are so immoral anyway*, deceive us about the *true* world. Moral: free yourself from the senses' deceit, from becoming, from history, from the lie—history is nothing but belief in the senses, belief in the lie. Moral: say no to everything that lends credence to the senses, to all the rest of humanity; all that is just 'the masses.' Be a philosopher, be a mummy, portray monotonous-theism with a gravedigger's pantomime!

25. "In its eternal aspect".

## N° 2

The distinguishing marks which have been given to the "true being" of things are the distinguishing marks of nonbeing, of *nothingness*—the "true world" has been constructed by contradicting the actual world: this "true world" is in fact an apparent world, insofar as it is just a *moral-optical* illusion.

It makes no sense whatsoever to tell fictional stories about "another" world than this one, as long as the instinct to slander, trivialize, and look down upon life is not powerful within us: in that case, we *revenge* ourselves on life with the phantasmagoria of "another," "better" life.

Dividing the world into a "true" and an "apparent" world, whether in the style of Christianity or in the style of Kant (a *sneaky* Christian to the end), is merely a move inspired by *décadence*—a symptom of *declining* life . . .



## Excerpts from "ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE" by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1896)

### N° 1

What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case? Does nature not conceal most things from him—even concerning his own body—in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibers! She threw away the key.

### N° 2

Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the "leaf": the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted—but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model. [...] This in turn means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves. We know nothing whatsoever about an essential quality called "honesty"; but we do know of countless individualized and consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are unequal and which we now designate as "honest" actions.

Finally we formulate from them a qualities occulta which has the name "honesty." We obtain the concept [...] by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with [...] no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.

### N° 3

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions- they are metaphors that have become

worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

We still do not yet know where the drive for truth comes from. For so far we have heard only of the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone. Now man of course forgets that this is the way things stand for him. Thus he lies in the manner indicated, unconsciously and in accordance with habits which are centuries' old; and precisely by means of this unconsciousness and forgetfulness he arrives at his sense of truth.

#### N° 4

As a genius of construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding.

#### N° 5

Just as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them with honey, so science works unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the graveyard of perceptions. [...] Whereas the man of action binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept away and lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he will be able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist. And he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which continuously break in upon him, powers which oppose scientific "truth" with completely different kinds of "truths" which bear on their shields the most varied sorts of emblems. The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself.

## Excerpts from FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE's PREFACES

1) Every metaphysics and physics that knows some *finale*, some final state of some sort, every predominant aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not sickness that inspired the philosopher. The unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual goes to frightening lengths —and often I have asked myself whether, taking a large view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstanding of the body*.

2) The **great emancipation** comes suddenly, like an earthquake; the young soul is all at once convulsed, unloosened and extricated— it does not itself know what is happening. [...] a will and a wish awaken, to go forth on their course, anywhere, at any cost; a violent, dangerous curiosity about an undiscovered world flames and flares in every sense. "Better to die than live *here*" — says the imperious voice and seduction, and this "here", this "at home" is all that the soul has hitherto loved! A sudden fear and suspicion of that which it loved, a flash of disdain for what was called its "duty," a rebellious, arbitrary, volcanically throbbing longing for travel, foreignness, estrangement [...]. [...] It is, at the same time, a disease which may destroy the man, this first outbreak of power and will to self-decision, self-valuation, this will to *free* will. In the background of his activities and wanderings —for he is restless and aimless in his course as in a desert— stands the note of interrogation of an increasingly dangerous curiosity. "Cannot *all* valuations be reversed? And is good perhaps evil? And God only an invention and artifice of the devil? Is everything, perhaps, radically false? And if we are the deceived, are we not thereby also deceivers? *Must* we not also be deceivers?"— Such thoughts lead and mislead him more and more, onward and away. Solitude encircles and engirdles him, always more threatening, more throttling, more heart-oppressing [...].

3) From this morbid solitariness, from the desert of such years of experiment, it is still a long way to the copious, overflowing safety and soundness [...]; —to that *mature* freedom of spirit which is equally self-control and discipline of the heart, and gives access to many and opposed modes of thought. [...] *splendid* health, that excess which gives the free spirit the dangerous prerogative of being entitled to live by *experiments* and offer itself to adventure; the free spirit's prerogative of mastership!

4) "Why so apart? So alone? Denying everything that I revered? Denying reverence itself? Why this hatred, this suspicion, this severity towards my own virtues?" [...] "Thou shouldst become master over thyself and master also of thine own virtues. Formerly *they* were thy masters; but they are only entitled to be thy tools amongst other tools. [...] Thou shouldst learn how much *necessary* injustice there is in every for and against, injustice as inseparable from life, and life itself as *conditioned* by the perspective and its injustice.

# SECTION II

**Excerpt from "THE STAR OF REDEMPTION" by FRANZ ROSENZWEIG  
(1921)**

**F**ROM DEATH, it is from the fear of death that all cognition of the All begins. Philosophy has the audacity to cast off the fear of the earthly, to remove from death its poisonous sting, from Hades his pestilential breath. All that is mortal lives in this fear of death; every new birth multiplies the fear for a new reason, for it multiplies that which is mortal. *ABOUT DEATH*

[...] But philosophy refutes these earthly fears. It breaks free above the grave that opens up under our feet before each step. It abandons the body to the power of the abyss, but above it the free soul floats off in the wind.

[...] Man should not cast aside from him the fear of the earthly; in his fear of death he should—stay.

Excerpts from "BEING AND TIME" by MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1927)

1) Being-in is not a 'property' which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and *without* which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world' –a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only *because* Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a *world*.

2) Because Dasein essentially has a state-of-mind belonging to it, Dasein has a kind of Being in which it is brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself in its thrownness. But thrownness, as a kind of Being, belongs to an entity which in each case is its possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in terms of them, projecting itself upon them. Being alongside the ready-to-hand, belongs just as primordially to Being-in-the-world as does Being-with Others; and Being-in-the-world is in each case for the sake of itself. The Self, however, is proximally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self. Being-in-the-world is always fallen. Accordingly *Dasein's "average everydayness"* can be defined as *"Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others"*.

3) An understanding of Being belongs to Dasein's ontological structure. As something that is [Seiend], it is disclosed to itself in its Being. The kind of Being which belongs to this disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind and understanding.

4) Dasein's absorption in the "they" and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself – of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.

5) *That in the face of which one has anxiety [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such.* What is the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which anxiety is anxious [sich angstet] and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. [...] That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. [...] Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. [...] the world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement.

[...] That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*. Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. [...] it is already 'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere.

The obstinacy of the "nothing and nowhere within-the-world" means as a phenomenon that *the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety*. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the "nothing and nowhere", does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.

What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the *possibility* of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself. When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say that 'it was really nothing'. [...] Everyday discourse tends towards concerning itself with the ready-to-hand and talking about it. That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is nothing ready-to-hand within-the-world. So if the "nothing" –that is, the world as such– exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that *Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious*.

Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. [...] the *world as world* is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind.



[...] That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about –its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being *towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being –that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free for* (*propensio in...*) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.

[...] the everyday publicness of the "they", which brings tranquillized self-assurance –'Being-at-home', with all its obviousness– into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized [...] as Being-in-the-world. [...] By this time we can see phenomenally what falling, as fleeing, flees in the face of. It does not flee *in the face of* entities within-the-world; these are precisely what it flees *towards* – as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the "they", can dwell in tranquillized familiarity. When in falling we flee *into* the "at-home" of publicness, we flee *in the face of* the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein –in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being. This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they" [...].

[...] This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being.

6) *No one can take the other's dying away from him.* Of course someone can 'go to his death for another'. But that always means to sacrifice oneself for the Other 'in some definite affair'. Such "dying for" can never signify that the Other has thus had his death taken away in even the slightest degree. Dying is something that

every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all.

[...] In Dasein there is undeniably a constant 'lack of totality' which finds an end with death.

[...] Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one.

[...] Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.

[...] In anxiety in the face of death, Dasein is brought face to face with itself as delivered over to that possibility which is not to be outstripped.

[...] Being towards this possibility, as a Being which exists, is brought face to face with the absolute impossibility of existence.

[...] Death is deferred to 'sometime later', and this is done by invoking the so-called 'general opinion' ["allgemeine Ermessen"]. Thus the "they" covers up what is peculiar in death's certainty –that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its "when". Everyday Being-towards-death evades this indefiniteness by conferring definiteness upon it.

[...] It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing.

[...] In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-Being means to be able to understand itself in the Being of the entity so revealed –namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's *ownmost* and uttermost potentiality-for-Being –that is to say, the possibility of *authentic existence*.

[...] Being towards this possibility enables Dasein to understand that giving itself up impends for it as the uttermost possibility of its existence. Anticipation, however, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself *for*

accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free *for* one's own death, one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached.

[...] Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined [des so bestimmten Seienden], and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. [...] Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.

[...] *anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the "they", and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.*

|3|

Excerpts from "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?" by MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1929)

1) The indeterminateness of that in the face of which and for which we become anxious is no mere lack of determination but rather the essential impossibility of determining it.

2) All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere disappearance. Rather in this very receding things turn toward us. [...] We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this "no hold on things" comes over us and remains. Anxiety reveals the nothing.

We "hover" in anxiety. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. [...] In the altogether unsettling experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold onto, pure Dasein is all that is still there.

**"AS I WAS MOVING AHEAD OCCASIONALLY I SAW BRIEF GLIMPSES OF BEAUTY"**

**BY JONAS MEKAS** (2000)

The pain is stronger than ever. I've seen bits of lost Paradises and I know I'll be hopelessly trying to return even if it hurts. The deeper I swing into the regions of nothingness the further I'm thrown back into myself, each time more and more frightening depths below me, until my very being becomes dizzy. There are brief glimpses of clear sky, like falling out of a tree, so I have some idea where I'm going, but there is still too much clarity and straight order of things, I am getting always the same number somehow. So I vomit out broken bits of words and syntaxes of the countries I've passed through, broken limbs, slaughtered houses, geographies. My heart is poisoned, my brain left in shreds of horror and sadness. I've never let you down, world, but you did lousy things to me. This feeling of going nowhere, of being stuck, the feeling of Dante's first strophe, as if afraid of the next step, next stage. As long as I don't sum up myself, stay on the surface, I don't have to move forwards, I don't have to make painful and terrible decisions, choices, where to go and how. Because deeper there are terrible decisions to make, terrible steps to take. It is at forty that we die those who did not die at twenty. It is at forty that we betray ourselves, our bodies, our souls, by either staying on the surface or by going further but through the easiest decisions, retarding, throwing our souls back by thousands of incarnations. But I have come close to the end now, it's the question will I make it or will I not. My life has become too painful and I keep asking myself what am I doing to get out of where I am. What am I doing with my life. It took me long to realize that it's love that distinguishes man from stones, trees, rain, and that we can lose our love and that love grows through loving, yes, I've been so completely lost, so truly lost. There were times I wanted to change the world, I wanted to take a gun and shoot my way through the Western Civilization. Now I want to leave others alone, they have their terrible fates to go. Now I want to shoot my own way through myself, into the thick night of myself. Thus I change my course, going inwards, thus I am jumping into my own darkness. There must be something, somehow, I feel, very soon, something that should give me some sign to move one or another direction. I must be very open and watchful now, completely open. I know it's coming. I am walking like a somnambulist waiting for a secret signal, ready to go one or another way, listening into this huge white silence for the weakest signal or call. And I sit here alone and far from you and it's night and I'm reflecting on everything all around me and I am thinking of you.

I saw it in your eyes, in your love, you too are swinging towards the depths of your own being in longer and longer circles. I saw happiness and pain in your eyes and reflection of the Paradises lost and regained and lost again, that terrible loneliness and happiness, yes, and I reflect upon this and I think about you, like two lonely space pilots in outer cold space, as I sit here this late night alone and I think about all this.

**Excerpt from “DE PROFUNDIS” BY OSCAR WILDE (1905)**

1) Behind joy and laughter there may be temperament, coarse, hard and callous. But behind sorrow there is always sorrow. Pain, unlike pleasure, wears no mask. [...] There are times when sorrow seems to me to be the only truth. Other things may be illusions of the eye or the appetite, made to blind the one and cloy the other, but out of sorrow have the worlds been built, and at the birth of a child or a star there is pain.

2) Suffering is the means by which we exist, because it is the only means by which we become conscious of existence; and the remembrance of suffering in the past is necessary to us as the warrant, the evidence, of our continued identity. Between myself and the memory of joy lies a gulf no less deep than that between myself and joy in its actuality. Had our life together been as the world fancied it to be, one simply of pleasure, profligacy and laughter, I would not be able to recall a single passage in it. It is because it was full of moments and days tragic, bitter, sinister in their warnings, dull or dreadful in their monotonous scenes and unseemly violences, that I can see or hear each separate incident in its detail, can indeed see or hear little else.

3) The mere sense of the *lacrimae rerum*, of the tears of which the world is made, and of the sadness of all human things.

## Excerpts from "GOD, DEATH, AND TIME" by EMMANUEL LEVINAS

(1992)

### N° 1

It is for the death of the other that I am responsible to the point of including myself in his death. This is perhaps shown in a more acceptable proposition: "I am responsible for the other in that he is mortal." The death of the other: therein lies the first death.

N° 2 What we call, by a somewhat corrupted term, love, is *par excellence* the fact that the death of the other affects me more than my own. The love of the other is the emotion of the other's death. It is my receiving the other—and not the anxiety of death awaiting me—that is the reference to death.

We encounter death in the face of the other.



Excerpt from "IDEA OF PROSE"  
by GIORGIO AGAMBEN (1985)

*The Idea of Love*

To live in intimacy with a stranger, not in order to draw him closer, or to make him known, but rather to keep him strange, remote: unapparent—so unapparent that his name contains him entirely. And, even in discomfort, to be nothing else, day after day, than the ever open place, the unwaning light in which that one being, that thing, remains forever exposed and sealed off.

Excerpt from "THE UNAVOWABLE COMMUNITY"

by MAURICE BLANCHOT (1984)

THE DESTRUCTION  
OF SOCIETY,  
APATHY

The community of lovers — no matter if the lovers want it or not, enjoy it or not, be they linked by chance, by "*l'amour fou*," by the passion of death (Kleist) — has as its ultimate goal the destruction of society. There where an episodic community takes shape between two beings who are made or who are not made for each other, a war machine is set up or, to say it more clearly, the possibility of a disaster carrying within itself, be it in infinitesimal doses, the menace of universal annihilation.

[...]

Here is the room, the closed space open to nature and closed to other humans where, during an indefinite time reckoned in nights — though no night may come to an end — two beings try to unite only to live (and in a certain way to celebrate) the failure that constitutes the truth of what would be their perfect union, the *lie* of that union which always takes place by not taking place. Do they, in spite of all that, form some kind of *community*? It is rather *because* of that that they form a community. They are side by side, and that contiguity, passing through every form of empty intimacy, preserves them from playing the comedy of a "fusional or communional" understanding.

[...]

How not to search that space where, for a time span lasting from dusk to dawn, two beings have no other reason to exist than to expose themselves totally to each other — totally, integrally, absolutely — so that their common solitude may appear not in front of their own eyes but in front of ours, yes, how not to look there and how not to rediscover "the negative community, the community of those who have no community"?



Excerpt from "MEMORIES OF THE BLIND" by JACQUES DERRIDA (1990)

How to love anything other than the possibility of ruin? Than an impossible totality? Love is as old as this ageless ruin—at once originary, an infant even, and already old. Love doles out his *traits*; he sights, he comes on site, and sees without seeing—this blindfolded love.

Excerpt from "THE POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP" by JACQUES DERRIDA (1994)

'I renounce you, I have decided to': the most beautiful and the most inevitable in the most impossible declaration of love. Imagine my having thus to command the other (and this is renunciation) to be free (for I need his freedom in order to address the other *qua* other, in desire as well as in renunciation). I would therefore command him to be capable of not answering – my call, my invitation, my expectation, my desire. And I must impose a sort of obligation on him thereby to prove his freedom, a freedom I need, precisely in order to call, wait, invite. [...] As if I were calling someone – for example, on the telephone – saying to him or her, in sum: I don't want you to wait for my call and become forever dependent upon it; go out on the town, be free not to answer. And to prove it, the next time I call you, don't answer, or I won't see you again. If you answer my call, it's all over.

Excerpt from "NOLI ME TANGERE: ON THE RAISING OF THE BODY"  
by JEAN-LUC NANCY (2003)

Love and truth touch by pushing away: they force the retreat of those whom they reach, for their very onset reveals, in the touch itself, that they are out of reach. It is in being unattainable that they touch us, even seize us. What they draw near to us is their distance: they make us sense it [*sentir*], and this sensing [*ce sentiment*] is their very sense. It is the sense of touch that commands not to touch. It is time, indeed, to specify the following: *Noli me tangere* does not simply say "Do not touch me"; more literally, it says "Do not wish to touch me." The verb *nolo* is the negative of *volo*: it means "Do not want."<sup>52</sup> [...] *Noli*: do not wish it; do not even think of it. Not only don't do it, but even if you do do it (and perhaps Mary Magdalene does do it, perhaps her hand is already placed on the hand of the one she loves, or on his clothing, or on the skin of his nude body), forget it immediately. You hold nothing; you are unable to hold or retain anything, and that is precisely what you must love and know. That is what there is of a knowledge and a love. Love what escapes you. Love the one who goes. Love that he goes.

**Excerpt from "CORPUS II: WRITINGS ON SEXUALITY"**

**by JEAN-LUC NANCY**

(2013)

Therefore, it follows that relation happens only by means of distinction, and that it is—insofar as it is—what distinguishes beings (which I have here named bodies) without itself being. To say that there is no relation is then to state what is proper to relation: in order to be, it must not be a third thing between two. Rather, it must open the *between* as such: it must open the *between two* by means of which there are two. But what is between two is not either one of the two: it is the void—or space, or time (including, once again, simultaneous time), or sense—which relates without resembling, or resembles without uniting, or unites without finishing, or finishes without carrying to its end.

[...]

From

the moment there is plurality, there is incommensurability.

### Excerpts from JUDIT BUTLER's work

1) Masculine and feminine roles are not biologically fixed but socially constructed.

2) If gender attributes and acts, the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification, are performative, then there is no preexisting identity by which an act or attribute might be measured; there would be no true or false, real or distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity would be revealed as a regulatory fiction.

3) We act as if that being of a man or that being of a woman is actually an internal reality or something that is simply true about us, a fact about us, but actually it's a phenomenon that is being produced all the time and reproduced all the time, so to say gender is performative is to say that nobody really is a gender from the start.

4) When we say gender is performed, we usually mean that we've taken on a role or we're acting in some way and that our acting or our role playing is crucial to the gender that we are and the gender that we present to the world.

5) There is no original or primary gender a drag imitates, but gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original.

6) It's my view that gender is culturally formed, but it's also a domain of agency or freedom and that it is most important to resist the violence that is imposed by ideal gender norms, especially against those who are gender different, who are nonconforming in their gender presentation.

7) Sexual harassment law is very important. But I think it would be a mistake if the sexual harassment law movement is the only way in which feminism is known in the media.

8) In the earliest years of the AIDS crisis, there were many gay men who were unable to come out about the fact that their lovers were ill, A, and then dead, B. They were unable to get access to the hospital to see their lover, unable to call their parents and say, 'I have just lost the love of my life.'

9) The principle of academic freedom is designed to make sure that powers outside the university, including government and corporations, are not able to control the curriculum or intervene in extra-mural speech.

10) Honestly, what can really be said about 'the Jewish people' as a whole? Is it not a lamentable stereotype to make large generalizations about all Jews, and to presume they all share the same political commitments?

### RU PAUL's aphorism

We're all born naked and the rest is drag.

## Excerpts from "DIRT AND GENDER. PISS / SHIT. MALE FEMALE"

by Paul Preciado (2006)

There where the architecture seems to simply put in the service of the most basic natural needs (sleeping, eating, shitting, pissing...) its doors and windows, its walls and vents, regulating access and view, operate silently as the most discreet and effective of "gender technologies".

Like this, for example, Public toilets, generalized bourgeois institutions in European cities since the nineteenth century, thought first as body waste management spaces in urban areas.

[...]

At the door of each toilet, as the only sign, a gender interpellation: male or female, gentlemen and ladies, male or female hat, mustache or smooth face, as if I had to go to the bathroom and redo up the gender more than scrap it be urine and shit. No wonder if we shit or piss, whether you have diarrhea, nothing matters, neither the color nor the size. The only thing that matters is the GENUS.

[...]

We're not going to the bathroom to evacuate, but to make our gender needs. Let's not piss, but reaffirm the codes of masculinity and femininity in the public space.

[...]

An architecture that makes genders while, under the pretext of public hygiene, says mind simply the management of our organic dirt. DIRT>GENRE. Infallible productive economy that turns dirt into gender. Make no mistake: the capital-straight machine does not waste anything. Instead, each expulsion of organic manure serves as an occasion to reproduce gender. Innocuous machines that eat our shit are actually normative gender prostheses.

**Excerpt from “THE SYMPOSIUM” by PLATO (385-370 BC)**

In Ionia and other places, and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians, the custom is held to be dishonourable; the love of youths shares the evil repute in which philosophy and gymnastics are held, because they are inimical to tyranny; for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit, and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire, as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience; for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power.



# SECTION III

EXCERPTS FROM "LEVIATHAN or THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A  
COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL"

by THOMAS HOBBS (1651)

N° 1

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation ; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him : And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires ; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

*From  
Diffidence  
Warre.*

N° 2

*Out of  
Civil  
States,  
there is  
alwayes  
Warre of  
every one  
against  
every one.*

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre ; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting ; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known : and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre ; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain ; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together : So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting ; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

*The In-  
commodi-  
ties of such  
a War.*

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man ; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry ; because the fruit thereof is uncertain : and consequently no Culture of the Earth ; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea ; no commodious Building ; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force ; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth ; no account of Time ; no Arts ; no Letters ; no Society ; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death ; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

### N° 3

*The Passions that incline men to Peace.*

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.

### N° 4

*The Fundamentall Law of Nature.*

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore. as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.* *Naturally every man has Right to every-thing.*

**Excerpts from “SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT” by JOHN LOCKE (1689)**

**1)** Someone who wants to take away the freedom of someone else must be supposed to have a plan to take away everything else from the person, because freedom is the foundation of all the rest; and that holds in a commonwealth as well as in the state of nature.

This makes it lawful for me to kill a thief who hasn't done me any harm or declared any plan against my life, other than using force to get me in his power so as to take away my money or whatever else he wants. No matter what he claims he is up to, he is using force without right, to get me into his power; so I have no reason to think that he won't, when he has me in his power, take everything else away from me as well as my liberty. So it is lawful for me to treat him as someone who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. to kill him if I can; for that is the risk he ran when he started a war in which he is the aggressor.

**2)** In a state of nature where there is no authority to decide between contenders, and the only appeal is to heaven, every little difference is apt to end up in war; and that is one great reason for men to put themselves into society, and leave the state of nature. For where there is an authority, a power on earth from which relief can be had by

appeal, the controversy is decided by that power and the state of war is blocked.

**3)** [...] The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are strictly his. So when he takes something from the state that nature has provided and left it in, he mixes his labour with it, thus joining to it something that is his own; and in that way *he makes it his property*.

He has removed the item from the common state that nature has placed it in, and through this labour the item has had annexed to it something that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour is unquestionably the property of the labourer, so no other man can have a right to anything the labour is joined to—at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.

Someone who eats the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the forest, has certainly appropriated them to himself! Nobody can deny that the nourishment is his. Well, then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested them? when he cooked them? when he brought them home? when he picked them up under the tree? It is obvious that if his first gathering didn't make them his, nothing else could do

so. That labour marked those things off from the rest of the world's contents; it added something to them beyond what they had been given by nature, the common mother of all; and so they became his private right. Suppose we denied this, and said instead: He had no right to the acorns or apples that he thus appropriated, because he didn't have the consent of all mankind to make them his. It was robbery on his part to take for himself something that belonged to all men in common. If such a consent as that was necessary, men in general would have starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had provided them with.

[...]

You may object that if gathering the acorns etc. creates a right to them, then anyone may hoard as much as he likes. I answer: Not so. The very law of nature that in this way gives us property also sets limits to that property. God has given us all things richly... But how far has he given them to us? To enjoy. Anyone can through his labour come to own as much as he can use in a beneficial way before it spoils; anything

beyond this is more than his share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy

[...]

This appropriation of a plot of land by improving it wasn't done at the expense of any other man, because there was still enough (and as good) left for others—more than enough for the use of the people who weren't yet provided for. In effect, the man who by his labour 'fenced off' some land didn't reduce the amount of land that was left for everyone else: someone who leaves as much as anyone else can make use of does as good as take nothing at all.

[...]

Bread, wine and cloth are things we use daily, and we have plenty of them; but if it weren't for the labour that is put into these more useful commodities we would have to settle for acorns, water and leaves or skins as our food, drink and clothing. What makes bread more valuable than acorns, wine more valuable than water, and cloth or silk more valuable than leaves, skins or moss, is wholly due to labour and industry...

**Excerpt from "DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND BASIS OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN" by JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU**

(1755)

**N° 1**

The body of a savage man being the only instrument he understands, he uses it for various purposes, of which ours, for want of practice, are incapable: for our industry deprives us of that force and agility, which necessity obliges him to acquire. If he had had an axe, would he have been able with his naked arm to break so large a branch from a tree? If he had had a sling, would he have been able to throw a stone with so great velocity? If he had had a ladder, would he have been so nimble in climbing a tree? If he had had a horse, would he have been himself so swift of foot? Give civilised man time to gather all his machines about him, and he will no doubt easily beat the savage; but if you would see a still more unequal contest, set them together naked and unarmed, and you will soon see the advantage of having all our forces constantly at our disposal, of being always prepared for every event, and of carrying one's self, as it were, perpetually whole and entire about one.

**N° 2**

THE first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, "Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody."



**Excerpt from “DRAMA AND BEREAVEMENT”  
by MASSIMO CACCIARI  
(1978)**

Government is *art, technique*. [...] Peace, not being true, is but the organization of conflict.

The Sovereign *decides*; this decision founds law, rules. [...] “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception” (Carl Schmitt, 1922).

[...] There cannot be consensus (*universal* consensus) facing a ‘*pax apparens*’. There cannot be consensus (*universal* consensus) in a subjective decision.

[...] since, as we know, there is no true peace, wanting to pursue it means staying at war eternally.

## Activities

### SECTION I

1.

- a) What does chess consist in? What does life consist in?
- b) Is life similar to chess? Why (not)? How could sunrise and the origins of chess be linked?
- c) How come Borges speaks about some god behind God?

2.

- a) When does the soul reason best? Can truth be contemplated through the senses? How are Ideas grasped? (*Nº 1*)
- b) How could we distinguish Ideas from particulars? Which two kinds of existence are there? (*Nº 2*)
- c) What are the soul and the body like according to this scheme? Explain the way they bond. (*Nº 2*)
- d) What is the lover of learning able to achieve when he departs from life? Why? (*Nº 3*)

3.

- a) Match items on the left with those on the right bearing Plato's analogy in mind:

- |                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| 1) What is intellected. | a) Generation, growth and nourishment. |
| 2) Knowledge.           | b) Light.                              |
| 3) Opinion.             | c) The Sun.                            |
| 4) Truth.               | d) Sight.                              |
| 5) Existence and being. | e) What is seen.                       |
| 6) The Good.            | f) Darkness.                           |

- b) Is the Good beyond being? Justify your answer.

4.

- a) Why does Descartes intend to destroy all his former opinions? Does it have to do with science? (*Nº 1*)

- b)** Should he doubt what is not fully undubitable as much as what is blatantly false? Why (not)? How will he avoid the endless task of attacking each single “brick” of the “building” individually? (*Nº 1*)
- c)** What does prudence dictate regarding the senses? (*Nº 1*)
- d)** What are the Evil Genius’ intentions? What is Descartes’ strategy against him? (*Nº 2*)
- e)** What has Archimedes taught Descartes? (*Nº 3*)
- f)** If everything seems false, what truth then is left? Is it that nothing is certain, or rather that the doubter cannot but exist? (*Nº 3*)
- g)** What does Descartes find out concerning certain properties of, for instance, the triangle? How come this relates to proving God’s existence? (*Nº 4*)

**5.**

- a)** Where does the idea of God come from?
- b)** Where do ideas in general come from?

**6.**

- a)** Are we able to cognize the existence of sensuous objects? Why (not)?
- b)** Are we able to cognize the existence of objects of pure thought? Why (not)?

**7.**

Explain why the dream world may be considered the origin of all metaphysics.

**8.**

- a)** What does the death of God imply?
- b)** What could the Madman be talking about when he says we, His murderers, might have thus become gods?

**9.**

- a)** Describe conceptual mummies based philosophical Egyptianism. Explain the following formula: “being > becoming”. Which role do the senses play in the eyes of the traditional dogma? Why is history characterized as belief in the lie? What the heck is “monotono-theism”? (*Nº 1*)
- b)** Nietzsche is clearly referring to Plato’s philosophy. Elaborate on this fact. (*Nº 1*)

c) What are the distinguishing marks of the “true world”? Explain how the “actual world” ends up being contradicted by those who cling to the phantasmagoria of “another”, “better” life; what does their approach suggest with respect to the way time on Earth is valued? (Nº 2)

## 10.

- a) What is Nietzsche pointing to when he claims nature “threw away the key”? (Nº 1)
- b) How do we get to the concept of the universal, causal model according to which particulars have been sculpted? (Nº 2)
- c) What does truth have to do with illusions and craftwork? How come truthfulness is regarded as conventionally fixed lying? (Nº 3)
- d) Why are humans similar to bees? What tells one species apart from the other? (Nº 4)
- e) What is actually that which thinkers pretend to have discovered? (Nº 4)
- f) Why might science’s “great columbarium of concepts” be viewed as the “graveyard of perceptions”? (Nº 5)
- g) Why does the “man of action” bind his life to reason? (Nº 5)
- h) What does the “scientific investigator” need shelter against? How does he obtain such shelter? (Nº 5)
- i) What’s the fundamental human drive according to Nietzsche? (Nº 5)

## 11.

- a) Explain why Nietzsche states that a “misunderstanding of the body” may be the cause of the unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective/ideal performed by the schools of thought that crave for some “Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above”. (Nº 1)
- b) What happens when the “young soul” abandons the “at home” and enters the desert alone? Describe the “great emancipation” in your own words; do not forget to explain why it can turn into a disease. (Nº 2)
- c) The “mature freedom of spirit” comes after the period desertsolitariness; explain what it gives access to. What does “*splendid* health” bring about? (Nº 3)
- d) What does the notion of “tools amongst other tools” speak of? (Nº 4)


e) Why is “the perspective” essentially unjust? If life is ruled by the unfairness encountered alongside the diversity of viewpoints, then life isn’t exactly just... Do *you* agree? Justify your answer. (Nº 4)

## SECTION II

1.

Explain the following meme:

**Death: \*exists\***  
**Philosophy according to Rosenzweig:**



2.

a) Is Dasein ever free from Being-in? How are entities able to meet up with Dasein? (Nº 1)

b) What does Dasein’s state-of-mind give rise to? How would *you* describe Dasein’s “thrownness”? How does Dasein understand itself? (Nº 2)

c) What is “fallenness” and why is it intertwined with “inauthenticity”? (Nº 2)

d) “An understanding of Being belongs to Dasein’s ontological structure”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

e) “Dasein’s absorption in the ‘they’ and in the world of its concern reveals Dasein’s fleeing in the face of its authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 4)

- f)** How come that in the face of which one has anxiety is *Being-in-the-world as such*? What does anxiety have to do with “the obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’” and why does this make anxiety so different from fear? You should go into detail about the relationship between the utter insignificance of the innerworldly and the world in its worldhood. (Nº 5)
- g)** “The possibility of the ready-to-hand in general is equivalent to the world itself”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 5)
- h)** “Everyday discourse does not tend towards concerning itself with the ready-to-hand”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 5)
- i)** “Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted; and it throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about (its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world). In sum, it makes manifest its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 5)
- j)** “When in falling we flee *into* the ‘not-at-home’ (namely, the uncanniness which lies in Dasein), and we flee *in the face of* the ‘at-home’ of publicness”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 5)
- k)** Dasein’s uncanniness is not a threat to its everyday lostness in the ‘they’”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 5)
- l)** “Anxiety individualizes Dasein. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 5)
- m)** “*No one can take the other’s dying away from him.* Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. Hence death is in every case mine”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 6)
- n)** “In Dasein there isn’t any constant ‘lack of totality’ which finds an end with death”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 6)
- o)** “Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 6)
- p)** “Death is deferred to ‘sometime later’; the ‘they’ covers up what is peculiar in death’s certainty: that it is possible at any moment. Thus, everyday Being-towards-death evades the indefiniteness of its ‘when’ by conferring definiteness upon it”. True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 6)



**q)** “In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein understands the fact that death is not to be outstripped. Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the ‘they-self’, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself (in an impassioned freedom-towards-death)”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 6*)

**r)** “Being-towards-death is not essentially anxiety”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 6*)

**3.**

**a)** “It is essentially impossible to determine that in the face of which and for which we become anxious”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 1*)

**b)** “Anxiety does not reveal the nothing”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 2*)

**c)** “Where there is nothing to hold onto, pure Dasein is all that is still there”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 2*)

**4.**

Why do you think Jonas Mekas talks about “terrible decisions to make” and “terrible steps to take”?

**5.**

**a)** Explain the following phrase: “Out of sorrow have the worlds been built, and at the birth of a child or a star there is pain”. (*Nº 1*)

**b)** What does suffering have to do with memory and identity? Don’t you think joy can also be memorable? Sometimes there’s no right or wrong answer. (*Nº 2*)

**c)** Oscar Wilde was in prison when he wrote *De profundis*, do you believe that experience may have led him to conclude that the world is made out of tears? Anyway, how could we cheer the globe up?! Thoughts? (*Nº 3*)

**6.**

**a)** Explain the following phrase: “The death of the other: therein lies the first death”. (*Nº 1*)

**b)** What is love according to Levinas? Whose philosophy is he telling off when he speaks about the reference to death? (*Nº 2*)

**7.**

**a)** How come Agamben says we ought to keep the stranger strange?

**b)** What does it mean that this stranger remains forever exposed and sealed off? Please note the use of an oxymoron.

**8.**

**a)** Why do you think the community of lovers has as its ultimate goal the destruction of society? How come it entails the possibility of a disaster carrying within itself the menace of universal annihilation?

**b)** What does Blanchot mean when he talks about those two beings who try to unite only to live and to celebrate the failure of their perfect union? Why are precisely these circumstances the cause of their forming some kind of community?

**c)** What's the comedy of a "fusional or communional" understanding about?

**d)** What does it mean that during a night these two beings have no reason to exist than to expose themselves totally to each other so that their common solitude may unveil?

**e)** What's with "the negative community" ("the community of those who have no community")?

**9.**

Explain why we could not love anything other than the possibility of ruin (than an impossible totality).

**10.**

**a)** How come Derrida claims the highest (and somewhat contradictory) declaration of love might be the phrase "I renounce you"?

**b)** What's it all about with commanding the other to be free? Don't you sense the presence of an oxymoron?

**c)** Isn't it crazy how extreme Derrida's example is? Not only is A telling B to be free not to answer its call but also it's saying something like "don't you dare answer the next time I call you, or else we're done". Aren't you confused? Could this be a literary device or what?

**11.**

- a) "It is in being unattainable that love or truth touch us, for they draw their distance near to us. Touch itself forbids touching, as it reveals what is out of reach". True (T) or false (F)?
- b) According to Nancy, what do we hold? What are we able to retain?
- c) Explain the following advice: "Love what escapes you. Love the one who goes. Love that he goes".

**12.**

- a) "Relation occurs solely by means of distinction". True (T) or false (F)?
- b) "Relation is what distinguishes beings without itself being". True (T) or false (F)?
- c) "'There is no relation!' = 'In order to be, relation mustn't be a third thing between two; instead, it ought to display the *between* as such (namely, the *between two* by means of which there are two)'"'. True (T) or false (F)?
- d) "What is between two is neither one of the two nor the void which resembles without uniting". True (T) or false (F)?
- e) "There is incommensurability if there is plurality". True (T) or false (F)?

**13.**

- a) Give examples of some of those socially constructed approaches towards life that pretend to be exclusive to your gender. Do you abide by all of them? (*Nº 1*)
- b) "The postulation of a true gender identity seems to be a sort of regulatory fiction, inasmuch as there are no preexisting organic grounds by which what are ultimately performative acts and attributes might be weighed". True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 2*)
- c) "We do not act as if being a man or being a woman were something like a true, uniform internal reality". True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 3*)
- d) "We are not taking on a role or acting on the basis of gender expectations". True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 4*)
- e) "Gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original, and that's what drag imitates". True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 5*)
- f) "No one exerts violence against those who are nonconforming in their gender presentation". True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 6*)
- g) "Sexual harassment law movement is fundamental and it should be the only way in which feminism is known in the media". True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 7*)

- h)** “In the earliest years of the AIDS crisis, no gay person had trouble visiting their incurable partner in the hospital. They were all able to attend their funerals and mourn them properly”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 8*)
- i)** “The principle of academic freedom protects academia’s curricula against powers outside the university”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 9*)
- j)** “We should make larger and larger stereotypical generalizations about social groups or networks; they are truly harmless”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 10*)
- k)** “None of us is born naked. We’re all born arbitrarily dressed up in some genital-based manner. Costumes are given birth to along with babies”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Ru Paul’s aphorism*)
- l)** “Everybody’s in drag”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Ru Paul’s aphorism*)

#### 14.

- a)** “When we use a public bathroom, we end up taking a ‘gender bath’ . We reaffirm the codes of masculinity and femininity as we urinate and/or defecate”. True (T) or false (F)?
- b)** “Architecture minds simply the management of our organic dirt; it does not put genders together”. True (T) or false (F)?
- c)** “The hetero-capitalist machine wastes nothing. A clever, profitable economic structure turns trash into gender”. True (T) or false (F)?
- d)** “Toilets aren’t prescriptive gender prostheses”. True (T) or false (F)?

#### 15.

Match items on the top with those on the bottom according to Plato’s excerpt.

- 1) Philosophy.
  - 2) Gymnastics.
  - 3) Strong bonds of friendship or society among *men* (“the intelligent, superior gender” in the eyes of almost every society in history), aka male homosexuality.
- a) Training for the body → inconvenient for power-hungry tyrants.
  - b) Dissident cooperative projects and insights (“two heads are better than one!”) → inconvenient for power-hungry tyrants.
  - c) Training for the soul → inconvenient for power-hungry tyrants.

### SECTION III

1.

**a)** “Where total insecurity prevails, men ought to anticipate danger by increasing their power further and further (even through invasion) if they want to subsist, for standing only on their modest defense won’t be enough”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 1*)

**b)** “Out of civil states (that is, in the state of nature), there is always war of everyone against everyone, because there is no common power to keep all men in awe”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 2*)

**c)** Match items on the top with those on the bottom following Hobbes’ statement on the connection between the notion of *Time* and either the nature War or the nature of Weather (*Nº 2*):

1) Foul weather.

2) War.

3) Peace.

a) Not battle only, or the act of fighting, but a known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.

b) The state in which there isn’t any known will to contend by battle (the time when industry, agriculture, navigation, housing, knowledge, temporalization, arts, letters and society are possible).

c) Not a shower or two of rain, but an inclination thereto of many days together.

**d)** Correct the following sentence: “The passions that incline men to peace are fear of commodious living, desire of death and hope to destroy life by means of their industry”. (*Nº 3*)

**e)** “In the state of nature (that is, out of civil states), all people are governed by their own reason, which means everybody can do anything to preserve themselves. Hence in such a condition every man has a right to every thing (even to someone else’s body)”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 4*)

**f)** “The fundamental law of nature, wisely assumed by reason, says that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war”. True (T) or false (F)? (*Nº 4*)

## 2.

**a)** What do you think about Locke's statement on killing a thief who hasn't done any physical harm? Anyway, don't you think war is not exclusive to the "state of nature"? (Nº 1)

**b)** Why would men rather put themselves into society than remain in the state of nature? What's the role of authority? Why do you think Locke says that, in a state of nature, the only appeal is to heaven? (Nº 2)

**c)** "Private property comes from mixing one's own hands' labour with nature's abundance. An item is removed from the common natural setting by someone's work; in other words, labour marks certain things off from the rest of the world's contents". True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

**d)** "It's OK if there isn't enough and as good left in common for others; spoilage is all right, it's no crime against humanity". True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

**e)** "Men should ask for the whole species' permission before gathering what's necessary to live a good, healthy and comfortable life. Starvation/inanition is not an excuse". True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

**f)** "The very law of nature that gives us property also sets limits to that property". True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

**g)** "The appropriation of a plot of land is not done at the expense of any other man *if* there is still as good and enough left for others. Fencing off some land doesn't reduce the amount of land left for everyone else". True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

**h)** "Bread, wine and cloth have nothing to do with labour. Industry does not increase natural supplies' value". True (T) or false (F)? (Nº 3)

## 3.

**a)** Declare who wins and who loses (Nº 1):

1) Naked "savage man" VS. armed "civilised man".

2) Naked "savage man" VS. naked "civilised man".

**b)** Who was the real founder of society according to Rousseau? What was the role of "simple people" in these initial stages? (Nº 2)

**c)** Express your feelings regarding the following phrase: "[...] the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody". (Nº 2)

**d)** Rousseau and Locke are definitely not in the same page. Elaborate on this fact.



**4.**

- a)** Why do you think Cacciari says government is art/technique?
- b)** Explain the following phrase: "Peace, not being true, is but the organization of conflict".
- c)** "The sovereign decision, which founds law, is not a subjective decision". True (T) or false (F)?
- d)** "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception (namely, the state in which law is interrupted due to an emergency), which means law is somehow dependent upon the exclusion of law". True (T) or false (F)?
- e)** Does universal consensus really exist? Why (not)? Remember there are no objective decisions (each of them is biased).
- f)** Explain the following phrase: "Since there is no true peace, wanting to pursue it means staying at war eternally".

## SYLLABUS

### Section I: "The quest for grounds":

**1)** Borges' poem on chess: the ludic strife and the infinite regress of final causes. **2)** The loathing of corporal passions in Plato's theory of knowledge: Ideas and particulars; the indivisible, invisible and eternal in contrast with change and corruption; the body-soul opposition. The lover of learning as the only one capable of joining the gods after dying. The Idea of the Good and the analogy of the Sun. **3)** Descartes' hyperbolic and methodic doubt; the distrust of the senses. The need for unshakeable foundations in order to ensure the correct development of science. The evil genius. "*Cogito, ergo sum*". Immutable properties and the ontological argument for God's existence. **4)** The idea of God as an unlimited extension of human virtues in Hume's empirically-based philosophy. Kant: knowledge in terms of its bounds within sensible experience; the impossibility of cognizing, a priori, the existence of objects of pure thought. **5)** Nietzsche: the dream world as the origin of all metaphysics. The death of God and the Madman. Philosophical Egyptianism (being > becoming): conceptual mummies; the sensuous immorality of the "apparent world"; monotonous-theism. Nothingness or non-being as the distinctive mark of the "true world" postulated by philosophers; the decadent aversion to life as the cause of such abstract phantasmagoria. The absence of certitude. The omission of the distinguishing aspects prior to the concept of the (causal?) original model. Truth as an illusion and the posterior forgetfulness of its illusory character. Truth as conventionally fixed lying. The analogy of bees; conceptual manufacturing (artifacts). The tower of science as shelter against the abyss and chaos; the action man. Creative formation of fictional metaphors as an indispensable human impulse. The unconscious disguise of certain physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective or ideal as a result of a philosophical misinterpretation of the body. The "great emancipation" and desertic solitariness as a transitional state before the adventurer's "mature freedom"; the arrangement of little world pieces. Life as inseparable from the perspective and its injustice.

### Section II: "Human intimacies"

**1)** Rosenzweig: the denial of death across philosophy. **2)** Heideggerian Dasein; authentic and inauthentic existence; nullity or insignificance versus what's been publicly interpreted; anxiety (angst) in the face of Being-in-the-world; the "at-home" and the "not at-home" (uncanniness); Being-towards-death; possibilities and the anticipatory resolution: self-foundation. **3)** Jonas Mekas and the pain of lost Paradises; the responsibility of decision-making and the inner call. The notion of a suffering personal identity exposed in Oscar Wilde's prison epistle. **4)** Love as the fact that the death of the other affects one more than one's own death in Levinas' criticism of Heidegger's solipsist treatment. Agamben's idea of

love: intimacy with the forever strange and distant stranger, both exposed and sealed off. Blanchot and the encounter between lovers as the menace of universal annihilation; the celebration of the failure of every union; shared solitude; the community of those who have no community (the negative community). Derrida and the love for ruins; the renunciation of the other as a condition for respecting their freedom. The biblical phrase “Noli me tangere” in Jean-Luc Nancy’s view; touch as evidence of distance; the love for what escapes. The “between” that separates two different people. Incommensurability as the hallmark of plurality. **5)** Judith Butler: the cultural construction of gender roles; performativity; the lack of a biologically fixed absolute attribute. Regulatory fictions. Violence exerted against nonconformity. Feminism, the media and sexual harassment law. The principle of academic freedom. Stereotyping. Corporality’s costume. Paul Preciado: the “gender technologies” behind public toilet’s architectural design. **6)** In Plato’s Symposium: the crush between two intelligent beings as a threat to tyrannical power and the consequent prohibition of amorous bonds in certain barbarian regions; the prohibition of philosophy and gymnastics.

### **Section III: “The organization of conflict”**

**1)** Hobbes: the “state of nature”; the constant possibility of war of all against all; insecurity and fear of invasion; anticipation: the increase of power at the expense of the other as a means of conservation. The analogy between war and weather through the concept of time in the differentiation between war and battle. Total enmity; the right of each to all things, even to another’s body. The need for a fearsome common power in order to achieve peace; the Civil State. The discomforts of the state of war: the impossibility of industry, agriculture, navigation, housing, knowledge, temporalization, arts, letters, society. The fear of violent death as the passion that inclines men to peace. The possibility of a commodious living as the reason reason seeks peace. The Fundamental Law of Nature: “to endeavour peace even via war”. **2)** Locke: the state of war between the thief and the victim; the attack on freedom. The “state of nature”: the lack of any earthly authority to decide between contenders; the appeal to heaven. The great risk of war as a reason to enter into society. The annexation of one’s own work into nature’s abundance as a productive intervention regarding the justification of property; the maxim reminding “there has to be enough and as good left for others”. Labour’s partition of what’s common and the needlessness of consent. Beneficial use and the atrocity of waste. The comforts obtained through industry. **3)** Rousseau: the “noble savage” versus the evils of industrial machinery. The impostor who said “this is mine”. Private property and the establishment of civil society. **4)** Cacciari: government as art/technique. True peace versus “*pax apparens*”. The organization of conflict. The allusion to Carl Schmitt: The Sovereign as the one who decides on the state of exception. The impossibility of universal consensus due to the primacy of subjective decision-making. The pursuit of “true peace” as being at war eternally.